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Based on an interpretation of the European Union (EU) as a compound democracy, this 
article argues that the constitutionalisation of the European Union is necessarily a 
contested process.. A compound democracy is defined as a union of states constituted by 
units of different demographic size, political history and geographical interests, and as such 
is necessarily characterized by different views on its constitutional identity. The EU 
experience is analyzed from the perspective of the United States (US), which is a 
compound democracy by design. In both cases, constitutionalisation has been an open and 
contested process. However, whereas the US process was based on a common 
constitutional framework, at least since the Civil War, and has been ordered by a super-
majority procedure for settling disputes, the EU lacks a document that embodies a shared 
language and a procedure that is able to solve the disputes. As a result, the process of 
constitutionalisation in the EU, contrary to the one in the US, ends up periodically in 
stalemate. 
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1 The Argument  
The rejection of the Treaty on the Constitutional Future of Europe (henceforth 
Constitutional Treaty, CT) in the French and Dutch referenda of May 29 and June 1 2005, 
respectively, was considered a dramatic failure of the project to politically integrate the 
continent
1. By contrast, the agreement prepared by the June 2007 European Council 
meeting in Berlin, concluded during the European Council held in Lisbon and signed on 13 
December 2007 (the Lisbon Treaty), on transforming a large part of the CT into a set of 
amendments to the two existing treaties and on recognizing the Charter of Rights as a de 
facto third treaty, was considered evidence that the project of political integration was not 
dead after all
2. Subsequently, the Irish “No” to the Lisbon Treaty in the referendum of June 
12, 2008 gave renewed impetus to the view that the EU is incapable of advancing towards 
political integration. Which interpretation is the more appropriate one? 
The constitutional odyssey of the first decade of the 21
st century confirms both the 
EU’s structural difficulty to find a definitive solution to the issue of its constitutional 
                                                 
1 I am referring to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. It was signed on 29 October 2004, in 
Rome, by representatives of the then 25 member states of the EU and was subject to ratification by all 
member states. Most of them did so by parliamentary ratification or by referenda, but France and the 
Netherlands rejected it. Its main aims were to replace the overlapping set of existing treaties that compose the 
EU, to codify human rights throughout the EU and to rationalize its institutional system. The treaty’s failure 
to win popular support in France and the Netherlands caused some other countries to postpone or put their 
ratification procedures on hold, and the European Council (of heads of government or states of the member 
states) to call for a "period of reflection". 
2 Formally the Lisbon Treaty refers to  the Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Maastricht 
1992) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC, Rome 1957), the latter was  renamed 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Council of the European Union, 2007). The two 
consolidated treaties would form the legal basis of the EU and contain most of the content of the abandoned 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe or CT. Prominent changes in the Lisbon Treaty include the 
scrapping of the pillar system, reduced paralysis in the Council of Ministers due to  the use of qualified 
majority voting for an increased number of policies, a more powerful European Parliament through extended 
co-decision with the EU Council, as well as new tools for greater coherence and continuity in external 
policies, such as a long-term President of the European Council and a High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs. The Lisbon Treaty is scheduled to be ratified by all twenty-seven member states by the end of 2008, 
in time for the 2009 European elections. As of November 2008, twenty-four member states have ratified the 
Treaty, one (Ireland) has rejected it and two (the Czech Republic and Sweden) have not started the process of 
ratification yet. 
 
  2identity, as well as its structural need to look for such a solution. Because of the nature of 
the EU, its constitutionalisation is a contested process allowing for both centripetal and 
centrifugal outcomes, or more plausibly for periodical stalemates. The EU is a union of 
states which de facto has adopted a compound democracy model. As in other unions of 
states that have adopted this model, such as the United States (US) and Switzerland, also in 
the EU it is unlikely that a definitive solution to the dilemma of its constitutional identity 
will be found. Indeed, I will base this argument on a comparison of the EU with the first 
historical species of the genus of compound democracy, namely the US. I will proceed as 
follows: after defining the concept of compound democracy and constitutionalisation with 
reference to the EU (section 2), I will discuss the American (section 3) and European 
(section 4) experience with compoundness and constitutionalisation. Based on this 
comparison, the concluding section will analyse why the EU has ended up in a 
constitutional stalemate. 
 
2 Compound Democracy and Constitution 
Interpretations of the EU abound, although many of them are not helpful for 
understanding why its constitutional treaties (the CT and the Lisbon Treaty) are contested. 
The EU has faced contestation because it is much more than a regulatory system (Majone 
2005), a governance system (Scharpf 1999) or a federalizing system (Elazar 2001). The 
constitutional difficulties of the EU are not simply characteristic of a political system (Hix 
2005), but of a political system with democratic features. 
A polity is democratic when it meets basic criteria of representation and 
accountability. Regarding the first criteria, those who take decisions in the EU were elected 
either by citizens in national elections (members of the Council of Ministers) or European 
elections (members of the European Parliament), or nominated by politicians elected in 
national and European elections (members of the European Commission). Moreover, EU 
decision-makers are compelled to act within a complex system of separation and balancing 
of powers, which was gradually defined by the various treaties and they are subject to the 
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they have to face the periodical evaluation of the voters, thus satisfying also the second 
criteria of inter-institutional and electoral accountability. Certainly defining the EU as a 
democratic polity does not mean shielding it from criticism. However, such criticism needs 
to be placed in the context of the democratic model adopted by the EU. A democratic 
model concerns the way in which systemic divisions are institutionally and politically 
translated into authoritative decisions applicable to all members of the polity. The EU, 
however, has come to be organized along a democratic model that is very different from 
the ones adopted by its member states. 
The national models of the EU member states fall into two polar categories: the 
majoritarian/competitive model and the consensual/consociational model, with some EU 
member states oscillating between the two (Lijphart 1999; Fabbrini 2008a). These two 
models reflect the different nature of the existing cleavages in European societies. The 
majoritarian/competitive model characterises countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) 
where material (economic, social) divisions are more salient than other divisions, and 
where the main political actors share a homogeneous political culture. The 
consensual/consociational model, in contrast, characterises countries such as Belgium 
where cultural (linguistic, ethnic, religious) divisions are the most salient, and where the 
political actors do not share a common political culture. In both models, however, 
parliament is the only institution expressing popular sovereignty. Or better, both 
democratic models are characterised by a government, as a single institution, that reflects 
the political majority of the parliament, regardless of whether it is formed through a bipolar 
electoral competition or through post-electoral negotiations among the main actors of a  
multi-party system. 
The EU’s model of democracy is quite different. I define this model as compound 
democracy (Fabbrini 2007)
3. A compound democracy is a democracy for a union of states, 
                                                 
3 The concept of compoundness derives from the American debate. James Madison used it for the first time 
in the Philadelphia constitutional convention (1787). Robert A. Dahl has investigated in 1956 (now Dahl 
2006) the anti-majoritarian nature of Madisonian democracy. Vincent Ostrom (1987) has clarified the 
  4whereas the democratic models of the EU member states are characteristic of nation states. 
The compound nature of the EU is due, not only to the aggregation of distinct states and 
their individual citizens, but above all, to the asymmetric nature of these units. In the EU, 
the main divisions are between territorial units, i.e. member states, rather than between 
social classes or cultural communities (Bartolini 2005). In asymmetric unions of states, 
ultimate authoritative decisions are reached through the cooperation of multiple separated 
institutions. Contrary to the fusion of power systems of all EU member states, separation of 
power systems do not dispose of a government as a single institution. In the EU 
sovereignty is fragmented, pooled and shared by several separated institutions. The 
Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament represent different electoral 
constituencies, if not concurrent majorities, and operate on the basis of different temporal 
mandates. Nevertheless they are constrained to share decision-making power. Moreover, in 
the case of the Commission, a specific form of check and balance has been introduced, 
with the European Council nominating its members with the advice and consent of the 
Parliament. 
In sum, the EU, together with the US (Ostrom 1987) and Switzerland (Blondel 
1998, Zweifel 2002) represent different species of the genus of the compound democracy. 
The EU displays many more institutional similarities with the US and Switzerland than 
with its member states. Here, however, because of their comparable size and external 
influence I will focus on comparing the EU and the US only. In the US “the Constitution 
                                                                                                                                                    
political theory of a compound republic. David C. Hendrickson (2003) has discussed the unionist paradigm 
of a republic of many republics which inspired (with the republican and liberal paradigms) the American 
founding fathers. However in Europe the concept of compoundness has been generally unknown. Recently, 
Vivien Schmidt (2006) has used it for addressing polities characterized by a low degree of institutional 
centralization (such as Germany and Italy, other than the EU). In my approach, compoundness is more than a 
generic property of non-centralized political systems. Indeed, it is the analytical property of a democratic 
model characterized by a basic institutional feature: multiple separations of powers. It is an ideal-type 
comparable to Lijphart’s ideal-types of majoritarian democracy or consensual democracy, but distinguishable 
from them because of that institutional feature (and thus because of the properties of the political process 
structured by it). For this reason, in my parsimonious approach, the compound democracy model might be 
applicable only to those polities organized around multiple separations of powers (such as the US, 
Switzerland and the EU). It is interesting to notice that all three of them are unions of states, although with 
different degrees of integration. Of course, an analytical model, or ideal-type, cannot be confused with an 
historical case. In fact, it is a genus to which belong different species. 
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system was sui generis in establishing a continental order that partook of the character of 
both a state and a state system” (Hendrickson 2003: 258). The same might be said for the 
EU (Hendrickson 2006). Both the EU and the US are polities with a highly complex 
structure of multiple separations of powers in order to keep on board states of 
asymmetrical size (Fabbrini 2005).  
Having defined the democratic model of the EU, it is now necessary to identify its 
constitutional basis. The concept of a constitution is not as unequivocal as it might seem 
(Menéndez 2004). From the perspective of Comparative Politics (Lijphart 1999), we can 
distinguish, at least, between a formal and material constitution. A formal constitution is a 
single written document that it is regarded (by governed and governors alike) as the 
supreme text of the legal order, it regulates matters that are more fundamental than others 
and it may be changed only through stringent amendment procedures (Elster 1997). 
Although all formal constitutions establish the set of fundamental rights, institutional 
arrangements, and functional procedures that must regulate the workings of a given 
political community (which constitutes itself through this founding document), one might 
argue (with Elazar 1985) that important differences are detectable among them. In fact, 
some formal constitutions (as the American one) are first a frame of government and then a 
protector of rights (indeed, the Bill of Rights is a set of ten amendments added to the 
formal document two years after its approval), while other formal constitutions (as the ones 
approved in post Second World War Europe) have the features of a state code, expression 
of a declared democratic ideology (indeed, the French or Italian constitutions start with a 
definition of fundamental rights and end with a specification of powers and procedures to 
preserve them).  
On the contrary, a material constitution consists of the social practices, derived 
from political conventions, historical traditions, specific judiciary regulations or ad hoc 
fundamental laws (considered of an equivalent status of a constitution) recognized as the 
basic norms of a given society. It is the case of democratic countries like UK, Germany or 
Israel: in the first case the material constitution is constituted by an historical accumulation 
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polity, in the other two cases by an ad-hoc basic law (called Grundgesetz in post Second 
World War Germany)
4. Evidently the EU does not have a formal constitution, but it is 
indisputable that it does have a material constitution consisting of the juridical expression 
of high-order principles (such as supremacy of Community law or direct effect of 
Community law on individual citizens) established by the ECJ on the basis of the treaties 
and recognized as such by the member states and their citizens.  
Thus, the ECJ has interpreted the founding treaties as quasi-constitutional 
documents, and these rulings have gradually been integrated into the constitutional orders 
of the member states (Everson and Eisner 2007; Craig and De Burca 1999; De Witte 1999; 
Mancini 1998). Contrary to other international treaties, the EU treaties have thus given rise 
to a legal order which not only binds the governments that signed them (as it is typical  of 
international treaties) but which is also of direct influence on the citizens of its member 
states (Curtin and Kellerman 2006; Weiler 1999). Accordingly, one might argue that this 
material constitution has sustained a process of constitutionalisation, where the latter has 
to be interpreted as “an exclusively descriptive concept (indicating) the recollection of 
constitutional norms, rules and decisions as outcomes of a process” (Wiener 2008: 26). 
However, stressing the empirical quality of the process of constitutionalisation, intended as 
the creation of a functional integrated legal order in a given political territory (Rittberger 
and Schimmelfennig 2007; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998), cannot imply to 
underestimate its normative implications (Maduro 2003), as it is recognised by several 
authors (O’Neil  2008; Longo 2006).  
Indeed, the normative activity of the ECJ has arisen from the need to deal with the 
‘functional’ problems emerging from increasing levels of trans-national exchange and 
cross-border cooperation (Stone Sweet 2005; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein 2001). 
                                                 
4 Both in (West) Germany and in Israel it was an explicit choice of the post Second World War ruling 
political elite to approve a fundamental law but not a constitution. Through that choice, that political elite 
wanted to underline the ‘transitory’ nature of the political regime, because of the still Jewish Diaspora (in the 
Israeli case)  and the division between the west and east Germans (in the Germany case). It is interesting to 
notice that the 1990 Deutsche Einheit or ‘German unity’ was not based on (finally) a new formal constitution. 
Indeed, it has coincided with the inclusion of the five Eastern Länder into the West German federal state. 
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economic actors operating in different national jurisdictions, and this in turn has required 
the Community’s judicial organ, the ECJ, to play an active role in settling them. The ECJ 
has used the opportunities afforded by the treaties to construct a new legal order for a 
supranational market, transforming those treaties into sources of law superior to those of 
the EU member states. This constitutionalisation has gradually transformed the European 
nation states (with few exceptions among the established democracies, such as Norway and 
Switzerland) into member states of the EU (Sbragia 1994). The traditional European nation 
states have had to redefine their sovereignty by sharing it with other nation states within 
the context of the EU institutional structure. If sovereignty coincides, at least empirically, 
with the power of taking ultimate decisions, the nation states of Europe, becoming EU 
member states, have come to share this ultimate decision-making power (on several 
policies affecting their own societies) with institutional actors ‘external’ to each of them 
(the other member states’ representatives in the Council and the members of the Brussels 
Commission and the Parliament). Thus, empirically, each EU member state has remained 
sovereign in some policy fields (very few indeed) but not in others (quite a few indeed).  
However, there is a crucial difference between the EU and the US. The US is based 
on a founding document and its amendments (the constitutional text), whereas the EU is 
based on successive inter-state treaties. Constitutionalisation based on inter-state treaties, 
originally addressed to create an economic union (a common market), is significantly 
different from constitutionalisation based on a constitutional, formally addressed to create 
a political union (Weiler and Haltern 1998; Ackerman 1991). In fact, my argument is that, 
whereas in the US the constitutional text has furnished a normative language for framing 
the divisions on the nature of the constitutional order (at least after the Civil War of 1861-
65), in the EU the inter-state treaties’ basis of the polity could not frame the normative 
discourse on its nature. Moreover, while the constitutional text of the US has allowed for 
the use of super-majority’s criteria for emending it, on the contrary the inter-state treaties 
of the EU have imposed the unanimity’s criteria for changing them, thus making the 
dispute on the future of EU constitutional order highly uncertain. Because the US provides 
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comparison there in order to better identify the problems besetting the constitutionalisation 
of a compound democracy. 
 
3 Compound democracy and constitutionalisation in the US 
3.1  The American experience with compoundness 
Whereas the EU is a compound democracy by necessity, the US is a compound 
democracy by design. Indeed Ostrom (1987), following James Madison, called it a 
compound republic. Although it is legitimately assumed that the American constitution 
celebrates a covenant among citizens (“in America…it is the People who are the source of 
rights”, Ackerman 1991: 15), however it is important to recognize that it was a covenant 
among citizens organized into distinct states (Elazar 1988). As Forsyth (1981: 65) has 
explained, “neither the preamble, nor Madison’s successful endeavour to provide the 
constitution with a deeper foundation than that of a normal treaty between governments, 
prevented it from being considered from the start as a species of contract or compact. 
Ratification was unequivocally a matter for each state individually; none could be bound 
without their assent”. The US constitution is the first peace pact among republican (or 
democratic, we would say today) states of different demographic size, material capabilities 
and cultural values (e.g. slavery). As Hendrickson (2003: 7) has written, “it seems fair to 
denominate the federal Constitution as a peace pact, the most unusual specimen of this 
kind yet known to history”. It is a pact designed to anticipate possible conflicts among 
independent states located on the same territory. In fact, had a conflict broken out, the 
independence of all states would have been jeopardized, because of the interests of the 
great European powers to play off one state or group of states against the other (Deudney 
2007: Chapter 6). Thus, the US represents the first attempt to avoid a repetition of the 
experience already familiar from Europe at the end of 18
th century, namely the inability of 
balance of powers systems to prevent war (Onuf and Onuf 1993). 
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constructing a polity that combines inter-states and supra-states features. This polity 
necessarily had to be open to different and changing policy outcomes. A union of 
asymmetric states can prosper only by hampering the formation of political and 
constitutional majorities (Kernell 2003). Such majorities should be able to emerge only 
when there is an overwhelming consensus in the country, something that historically has 
occurred only in the wake of major domestic or international crises or traumas. Finally, the 
Philadelphia constitution was approved by a large majority of the states, but not by all, 
through legislative decisions or ad hoc constitutional conventions. Indeed, the US 
constitution cannot be subjected to the exam of states’ popular referendum. 
Because the US aggregates previously independent states, it is not surprising that 
the constitution only defines the few competences of the federal centre, leaving all the rest 
to the federated states (Ostrom 1991). In order to assure all the would-be members of such 
a union, the delegates at Philadelphia devised an institutional system of vertical and 
horizontal separation of powers able to prevent the formation of factional majorities, with 
the Supreme Court as the guardian of that structure. All of the separated institutions, both 
at the centre (President, House of Representatives and Senate) and in the states (governors 
and bicameral legislatures
5), were endowed with independent legitimacy: direct legitimacy 
in the case of the House of Representatives, indirect in the case of the President and the 
Senate until 1913. In addition, each institution has its distinct operational time-span. 
Accordingly, no institution depends on the others in order to function and none of them 
requires the confidence of the others in order to perform its tasks. As Neustadt (1990: 27) 
has written, in Philadelphia “a government of separated institutions sharing powers” was 
created. Moreover, the power of judicial review implies that every decision taken by the 
legislature and countersigned by the President can be annulled by any court that considers 
                                                 
5 With the sole exception of Nebraska which adopted a unicameral system in 1934. 
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European nation states
6. 
Hence, the American constitution introduced a hierarchy of norms without, 
however, introducing a corresponding hierarchy of institutions or organized powers. In 
particular, it did not solve the question of the relation between the federal state and the 
federated states, as became evident with the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. To be sure, 
for the first century of the new republic, Congress played a much more relevant role than 
the President and the federated states were much more influential than the federal state 
(congressional government). However, since the 1930s and especially since the end of the 
Second World War, the President has become pre-eminent vis-à-vis the legislature as has 
the  federal centre vis-à-vis the states (presidential government) (Lowi 1985). However, the 
increasing role of the President has not diminished the power of Congress (Polsby 2004). 
Indeed, with the full institutionalisation of the presidency, the US has become a fully 
separated governmental system (Jones 1999), and the increasing role of Washington D.C. 
has not prevented the states from playing a more influential role in policy-making since the 
1970s (Conlan 1998). The power pendulum has continued to swing back and forth (Beer 
1993). 
Defining a hierarchy of norms in Philadelphia was not a simple undertaking 
because of diverging state interests. The absence of a clear correspondence between norms 
and institutions does much to explain the failure of the first US constitution of 1781 
(known as the Articles of Confederation), and the dramatic crisis of the second one (with 
the Civil War of 1861-65). However broad the consensus on a supreme legal text may have 
been at Philadelphia in 1787, it was much more limited with respect to fundamental issues 
                                                 
6 Of course, in these political regimes the governors are obliged to respect constitutional principles and 
procedures, but once they have done so they are constitutionally empowered to legislate. Such legislation 
may be subject to constitutional review exercised by a specific constitutional court and initiated by another 
public institution, but it is certainly not subject to a judicial review initiated by an individual citizen and 
exercised by ordinary courts (on the crucial difference between constitutional review and judicial review see 
Stone Sweet 2000: Chapters 2 and 5). 
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institutions within them. Contrary to the interpretation that the US was a ‘naturally’ 
homogeneous country (as John Jay ideologically argued in the Federalist no. 2, when he 
stated “that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united 
people – a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, 
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in 
their manners and customs…”, now in Beard 1948: 39), the US was and has continued to 
be a highly divided country for all of its history. Periodic waves of immigrants, with their 
distinct ‘manners and customs’, have regularly fed the divided nature of the country. 
Since the Philadelphia Convention, therefore, the US has gone through cyclical 
crises of constitutionalisation that generally pitted groups of states against each other on 
specific issues. This was so in the 1830s with regard to the role and independence of the 
federal bank; in the 1860s regarding the sovereignty of the states in imposing slavery; in 
the 1930s regarding the role of the federal Congress and the President in regulating the 
economy; in the 1960s regarding the recognition of civil rights in the southern states; and 
finally this was the case in the 2000s regarding the powers of the President and Congress to 
restrict the rights of citizens for reasons of national security. In all these conflicts have 
emerged cleavages between small-medium and larger size states; between states with solid 
democratic cultures and states with racial preferences; between states promoting a 
continental market and states with protectionist outlooks; between states favouring a 
stronger federal role and states defending their own prerogatives. 
Constitutional cleavages between states not only triggered a dramatic Civil War, 
but have continued to structure the main political divisions of the country (Bensel 1987). 
More frequently the contrasts were between sections or regional groups of states, rather 
than between single states. In the US, these sections or group of states are distinguishable 
for their specific economic-productive basis (Sbragia 1996) or peculiar cultural identities. 
Indeed, utilizing the criteria of political culture, Elazar (1994: 284) has arrived to identify 
at least eight sections of the country: New England, Middle Atlantic, Near West, 
Northwest, Far West, Southwest, Upper South and Lower South. The political parties have 
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been inclusive confederations of different state and local interests rather than tools for the 
exclusive ideological mobilization of the electorate as in Europe (Epstein 1986; Chambers 
and Burnham 1975).  
Moreover, territorial conflicts have frequently overlapped with cleavages 
concerning the democratic nature of the political system. For a large part of the 19th 
century some defenders of the states’ powers as well as critics of the federal centre’s power 
had argued that, for obvious geographical reasons, only the states could ensure citizen 
participation in decisions. At the end of the 19
th and the beginning of the 20
th century, 
criticism of the federal centre’s democratic deficit assumed very different features. Having 
been forced to acknowledge the process of nationalisation that had traversed American 
politics (e.g., decisions increasingly came to be taken in Washington DC, Lunch 1987), the 
critics of the democratic deficit set out to democratize the federal institutions. The 
Progressives and the Populists thus advocated reform of both national and local systems 
(Kazin 1995). 
 
3.2 The American experience with constitutionalisation 
Although different views and interests of the states have characterized the political 
development of the US, nevertheless the constitution has furnished a procedure for solving 
them, albeit temporarily, without jeopardizing the compound nature of the polity. 
Certainly, the translation of a political majority into a constitutional one has been 
effectively constrained by the principle of the double super majority required for passing 
amendments. Article V stipulates that “whenever two thirds of both Houses shall […] 
propose amendments to this Constitution (the proposal) will be valid to all intents and 
purposes as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of the three-fourth of 
the several States, or by conventions in three-fourth thereof, as one or the other mode of 
ratification may be proposed by the Congress”. However, the principle of a double 
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shown by the twenty-six amendments approved so far at the federal level.  
Indeed, the ink on the constitution was not yet dry when the Americans began to 
discuss the need to amend it (Levinson 1995). The ten amendments known as the Bill of 
Rights, introduced as we know two years after the Philadelphia Convention, have ushered 
in a permanent discussion on the constitution. If twenty-six amendments have been 
approved so far, however thousands were proposed. However, no amendment has called 
into question the structure of multiple separation of powers characteristic of the US 
compound polity, nor has any political leader ever called into question the legitimacy of 
the principle of a double super-majority for changing the constitution. In fact, some of the 
amendments have changed specific properties of single institutions (like Amendment XVII 
of 1913 on the direct election of federal senators, or Amendment XXII of 1951 which 
states that “No person shall be elected to the office of President more than twice”); others 
have introduced a new interpretation of the fundamental rights (implicit or explicit) to be 
protected (like Amendment XIII of 1865 which abolished slavery, Amendment XIV which 
imposed the respect of basic rights to the states, or Amendment XV which recognizes that 
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude”).  
When reforms did aim to alter the compound nature of the republic, such as the 
proposal to substitute the Electoral College (an institution which over-represent the small 
states because of the un-representativeness of the Senate, Dahl 2001)
7 with the direct 
election of the President, the stringent amendment rules have enabled the opposing 
coalition (of small states’ representatives and electors) to thwart those proposals. 
Notwithstanding events in Florida during the presidential elections of 2000, the abolition 
                                                 
7 The American President is elected indirectly by ad-hoc presidential electors organized in the Electoral 
College of each state. Each state is entitled to a number of presidential electors equal to the number of 
representatives plus senators that state has in Congress (thus there is no a national college of presidential 
electors). This method of apportionment of the presidential electors obviously favours the small states over 
the big ones. In fact, whereas the number of representatives is proportional to the size of the population, the 
number of senators is not. Indeed, every state is entitled to two senators irrespective of its demographic size. 
Thus, through the states’ Electoral College, the smaller states carry a political weight disproportionate to their 
population in the election of the President (Fabbrini 2008: 28). 
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process for amending the constitution became politically rigid, owing to either the 
formation of conservative majorities able to control both chambers of Congress, or to the 
formation of veto minorities in one of the two federal chambers, or in the state legislatures, 
major constitutional changes were introduced via other channels, such as rulings by the 
Supreme Court (Ackerman 1991: Chapter Five), the latter now being considered an 
integral part of the constitution. 
Although constitutional disputes have been a constant feature of the US, these 
conflicts have been waged through a shared constitutional discourse. At least after the Civil 
War, and probably because of the trauma it generated (Greenstone 1993) those conflicts 
have been waged through a common constitutional language, or better, through the 
mobilization of some interpretations of the constitution in regard to issues of the day. The 
constitution’s language has delimited and defined what should be considered the legitimate 
political discourse. However, although Americans have come to recognize the constitution 
as the basis of their staying together, this coming together has not been based on a common 
interpretation of the constitution but on the effort to justify the divergent interests with 
reference to the same constitutional text. Ackerman (1991: 36) has written that “because 
Americans differ so radically…our constitutional narrative constitutes us a people”. The 
amendment procedure, although stringent, has furnished the ‘safety valve’ allowing the 
constitution to be adapted to a changing environment, if considered necessary by a large 
(super) majority of federal and states’ representatives. 
In concluding, one may thus answer the question raised by Bernstein (1995) in the 
sub-title of his book, ‘if (the Americans) love the Constitution so much, why do (they) 
keep trying to change it?’, by saying that it could not have been otherwise. The Americans 
could not, and cannot, achieve a definitive consensus on their constitutional identity. This 
is why the process of constitutionalisation continues to be highly contested in the US. 
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4.1 The European experience with compoundness 
The EU is a different species of compound democracy than the US in terms of its 
‘systemic foundations’ (see Table 1). Nonetheless, the logic of functioning and the 
institutional structure of the EU and the US seem to be quite similar (Fabbrini 2007: 
Chapter 8).  
Table 1 – The US and the EU: systemic foundations  
  United States  European Union 
Aim  to avoid possible wars  to close an era of wars 
Perspective  through a political union   through an economic community 
Logic  based on fragmented sovereignty  based on pooled sovereignty 
Structure  organized around formal separation 
of powers 
organized around multilevel separation of 
powers 
Justification  to prevent the tyranny of majorities  to create a common market 
  
Certainly, the EU started (with the Rome Treaty of 1957) as a project for building 
an integrated continental market. Indeed, after the 1954 rejection of the European Defence 
Community’s project by the French Parliament, the main European political leaders of the 
time decided to promote the integration of the continent through economic means rather 
than political principles. However, it was clear to the founding fathers of the (then) 
European Economic Community established by the Rome Treaty that Europe had to find a 
way to permanently close a long era of intestine civil wars (Judt 2005). Thus, also the EU 
may be considered as the outcome of a pact for promoting peace among traditionally 
warring states. a pact based on an economic cooperation through a common market 
regulated by a complex institutional framework. Moreover, although the purpose of the 
treaties, especially of the 1957 Rome Treaty, was to create the conditions for a civil pact 
among traditional enemies, the latter had already established a military pact, tutored by the 
US, through the NATO (which was established in 1949 and thus strengthened in 1955 with 
the integration of West Germany) (Calleo 2001; Ikenberry 2000). 
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had shown to be the source of permanent inter-states insecurity, thus triggering periodic 
attempts by individual states (the strongest ones at the moment) to impose an imperial 
order on the continent. Thus, the European nation states had to recognize that their best 
chance of avoiding war was to build a novus ordo seclorum, although they decided to start 
from an economic cooperation in order to mature the conditions for a more advanced 
integration. Thus, what we now call the EU is an attempt to steal out from the Westphalian 
solution to inter-states rivalry without however giving a political justification to that 
attempt. Whereas the founding of the US was based on the formidable justification 
furnished by the Madisonian theory of the need to protect the union from the formation of 
tyrannical majorities (of states and/or citizens) that might jeopardize its very existence 
(Kernell 2003; Dahl 2006), the EU lacked any political justification of its institutional 
compoundness  since its inception. It was probably a necessary choice to do that. However, 
some of the problems the EU is facing today are the inheritance of that choice. 
With the EU, for the first time in history, the European nation states have tried to 
build an institutional order which combines intergovernmental as well as supranational 
features through negotiation over economic issues of common concern. In fact, as 
historical experience had amply shown, the peace pact couldn’t be guaranteed solely by an 
intergovernmental agreement, but it needed to be protected by supranational Community 
institutions. Without authorities institutionally separated from the states that had created 
them (such as the Commission, the Parliament and the ECJ), there could be no guarantee 
that the signatories to the intergovernmental agreement would abide by their own rules. In 
the EU, Community features are thus necessary in order to protect the union from inter-
state rivalries and instability. In this sense, the EU has been an attempt to domesticate the 
external relations of the European nation states, creating an international regime with 
domestic features. 
However, if the foundations of the peace pact resided in trans-national cooperation 
on a growing number of economic matters (Lindberg 1963), this cooperation has led 
nevertheless to the progressive institutionalisation of the close network of Community 
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and the Parliament, the Court – but also institutions not originally envisaged, such as the 
European Council. The institutionalisation of the structure of multiple separations of 
powers between the Brussels’ institutions and between them and the institutions of the 
member states has strengthened the compound nature of the EU. Since the 1986 Single 
European Act (SEA), the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (which introduced a three pillar 
structure) and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has progressively become a system in 
which several institutions separately but jointly contribute to numerous public policy 
decisions. This structure primarily concerns the first pillar, whereas the other two have 
tried to preserve the nature of an intergovernmental agreement, although the process of 
cross-pillarisation has also led these two pillars to be affected by the logic of the former 
(Stetter 2007; von Bogdandy 2000).  
Thus, the originally pre-eminent institution in the system, i.e. the Council of 
Ministers has been forced to acknowledge the considerable influence acquired by the 
Commission. In addition, it has been obliged to recognize the co-determination and co-
decisional power acquired by the Parliament since its direct election in 1979, and 
especially since the SEA and the two fundamental treaties of the 1990s. Whereas the 
formation of an hegemonic coalition was possible within an institutionally dominant 
Council of Ministers (as shown by the so-called Franco-German axis leading the 
Community decision-making process till the 1980s, Hendricks and Morgan 2001), this has 
become much more difficult after the treaties of the 1980s and 1990s (and thus the 2001 
Nice Treaty). These treaties have, in fact, contributed to a deeper institutionalisation of the 
separated decision-making structure of the EU. To be predominant in the Council has 
become no longer a condition for being predominant in the other Community institutions 
(Fabbrini and Piattoni 2007). Moreover, the several waves of enlargement, which have 
brought the EU to be constituted by now 27 member states, have made the outcomes of the 
policy-making process highly uncertain. Thus, the institutionalisation of a structure of 
multiple separations of powers has gradually nested an anti-majoritarian logic within the 
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leadership within institutional and political constraints.  
In sum, like the US, the EU has come to function without a government acting as a 
single institution. In Brussels decisions are taken and values are authoritatively allocated, 
but this is the outcome of a process of negotiation and deliberation involving a plurality of 
actors and taking place within the loose confines of a system of separated institutions. It is 
interesting to notice that the growing influence of the Community institutions representing 
supranational interests has not reduced the influence of the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council, that represent the member states and therefore the intergovernmental 
side of the EU (Dinan 2005). The EU institutionalisation has gradually strengthened the 
powers and competences of the various institutions in a positive sum game. 
As a result of the progressive deepening of European integration, i.e. the 
proliferation of public policies decided in Brussels, the role of the EU has become 
increasingly more political and less economic. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War and 
the prospect of the political reunification of the continent, the dispute on the finalité of 
European integration has acquired a constitutional character. The necessity to give a 
constitutional identity to the EU emerged during (and after) the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) held in Nice in December 2000 and whose treaty was signed in 2001 
(European Council 2000). Recognition of a Charter of Rights (though not its inclusion) in 
the 2001 Treaty of Nice has further stoked the debate on the constitutional nature of the 
EU. Given the unsatisfactory outcome of that treaty, the European Council held in Laeken 
(Belgium) on 15 December 2001 adopted a Declaration on the Future of the Europe that 
committed the EU to defining its constitutional basis (European Council 2001). Indeed, the 
Laeken Council convened a Convention in Brussels bringing together the representatives 
of both the member states’ governments and parliaments and Community institutions with 
the task of preparing a draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe for the 2004 IGC. 
The Brussels Convention lasted from February 2002 to June 2003, concluding its activities 
with a unanimous agreement on the proposed Constitutional Treaty or CT (Norman 2003; 
De Witte 2003). On 18 June 2004 the heads of state and government of the member states 
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closest approximation to a formal constitution ever agreed by member states’ governments, 
it has been rightly said that the outcome of the Brussels Convention has transformed the 
EU from a constitutional project (Walker 2004) into a constitutional process (Shaw 2005), 
the so-called ‘Laeken process’. 
 
4.2 Constitutional divisions in Europe 
This constitutional process has been characterized by deep divisions or 
constitutional cleavages concerning the organizational form the EU should assume, the 
strategies that should be pursued to organize the power of the Community actors 
participating in authoritative decisions, and the guarantees that should be introduced to 
promote and protect individual and social rights (Sbragia et al. 2006). The various 
cleavages that had remained submerged during the long period of material 
constitutionalisation of the EU have thus surfaced. Some of the conflicts that emerged 
during the Laeken process were of a temporary nature as the position of some member 
states on specific issues changed in relation to the government of the day. However, other 
divisions had a more permanent character, reflecting stable differences of views and 
interests among member states (and their citizens), due to their different size, history and 
political expectations. 
The first of these structural cleavages concerns the division between large and 
medium-small member states. This conflict is an effect of asymmetries between EU 
member states. It has surfaced regularly during the history of the EU: as e.g. in the 2000 
Nice Treaty’s negotiations, when a medium member state such as Spain was able to obtain 
very favourable conditions for the weighting of its votes within the Council of Ministers, 
thus benefiting future candidate states of equivalent size, such as Poland. The same has 
happened during the debate on the CT where Spain and Poland tried to maintain their 
favourable condition (which over-represented them) in the newly designed Council of 
Ministers. The compromise found in the Rome European Council of October 2004 
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effective if supported by a majority of 55 per cent of the member states representing at 
least 65 per cent of the population, was subsequently challenged by Poland at the Berlin 
European Council of June 2007. In the Lisbon Treaty the Polish government obtained a 
deferral of the introduction of this rule to November 2014 with an additional transition 
period until March 2017, during which a member state can ask for a qualified majority on a 
specific issue if considered of national importance (Council of the European Union 2007). 
The same cleavage also emerged on the issue of the Commission’s composition during and 
after the Brussels Convention (Magnette and Nicolaïdis 2004). The small and medium 
member states obtained that each member state be allocated one commissioner whereas the 
large member states advocated setting the number of the commissioners to two thirds of 
the member states. The Lisbon Treaty (article 17) establishes that the number of 
Commissioners be reduced, in the sense that only two out of three member states would 
have the right to representation on a rotating basis, but the introduction of this rule has 
been postponed to 2014 (European Union 2008).  
The second structural cleavage has been the traditional one between the countries of 
western continental Europe and the countries of northern insular Europe. For years this 
cleavage has accompanied the process of European integration, in particular since 1973 
when the UK, Denmark and Ireland joined the EU (Gilbert 2003). This cleavage reflects 
the different historical experiences of the ‘islands’ and the ‘continent’ in the formation of 
the nation state and its international extensions. The former consider the deepening of the 
integration process a threat to their national sovereignty, which is to be countered by 
pressing for further enlargement (Geddes 2004). Although the process of Europeanisation 
has curtailed the sovereignty of the member states on many public policies, this has not 
impeded some of them from defending their founding myths. In these countries, the 
defence of sovereignty springs from the distinct historical phenomenon of democratic 
nationalism: it is nationalism which has enabled them, and especially the UK, to preserve 
democracy (MacCormick 1996). Indeed, the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden have 
obtained several opt-outs from parts of the treaties in question. In exchange for signing the 
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of Fundamental Rights and together with the Irish government it has also opted out from 
the change from unanimous decisions to qualified majority voting in the sector of Police 
and Judicial Co-operation in criminal matters. Yet, these and other opt-outs were not 
sufficient to assure the Irish voters on the occasion of the 2007 referendum on that treaty. 
The historical experience of the continental countries of Europe has been very 
different. Here, nationalism had erased democracy, owing to a set of cultural and 
ecological factors. The development of the democratic state encountered much more 
unfavourable conditions in the ‘land-bound’ European countries than in the ‘sea-bound’ 
ones (Tilly 1975). In the former, nationalism was frequently anti-democratic (Smith 1991), 
bending to (or sustaining) the centralizing ambitions of dominant authoritarian groups. For 
the EU member states that inherited this historical experience and memory, integration 
represented the antidote to the virus of authoritarian nationalism, whereas those that have 
inherited the ‘island’ experience view political integration as a threat to their democratic 
identity. It must be added, however, that important sections of the French elites regard 
integration also as an opportunity to promote a larger role for France (Guyomarch, Machin 
and Richtie 1998). In this sense, the cleavage between these two Europe is also an effect of 
the competition between two traditional European powers, with the UK traditionally in 
favour of a Europe firmly allied with the US, and France favouring a Europe independent 
from, if not competing with, the US (Garton Ash 2004). 
The third structural cleavage has opposed many citizens and significant sections of 
the political elites of the new member states of Eastern Europe to the old ones of Western 
Europe. In particular, the nationalistic governments of some new member states such as the 
Polish government of the period 2005-2007 and the Czech government after the elections 
of 2007 have been preoccupied with defending their regained national sovereignty after 
almost half a century of domination by the Soviet super-power. These governments seem 
to view the EU mainly as a customs union, i.e. an open market in which they can remedy 
their economic backwardness without constraints on their political sovereignty. However, 
their views did not necessarily coincide with those of the northern ‘islands’ who tend to 
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more disinclined to do so (Zielonka 2006). The confederalism of the northern islands does 
recognize the importance of the Community institutions and rules in the first pillar of the 
common market. The customs union view of some of the eastern member states, instead, 
has a purely commercial outlook. Certainly, these territorial cleavages are only indicative 
of the constitutional divisions existing within the EU. In fact, in the northern islands as 
well in the eastern member states there are those in favour of greater political or federal 
integration, just as there are influential groups pushing for economic or confederal 
integration in western continental Europe. Yet, these cleavages express relatively stable 
divisions concerning the constitutional future of the EU. 
These geographical divisions, in turn, have been overlapped by a territorial 
cleavage of a political kind. As shown by the French referendum of 2005 in particular, 
popular criticism has emerged that views the EU as taking too many decisions while being 
insufficiently democratic (Taggart 2006). For a long time some observers have argued that 
the EU suffers from a democratic deficit (Marquand 1979). Unlike the cabinet in 
parliamentary systems, the EU indeed does not have a political decision-making body that 
voters can judge politically. Given the separation among the institutions that structures the 
decision-making process and the number of actors involved, it is highly implausible to 
establish ‘who has to be considered responsible for what’ in the EU. However, if one takes 
into consideration the systemic constraints of a union of asymmetrical states, then this 
criticism would seem misplaced. Even in its federal form, a union of asymmetrical states 
cannot be organized along the vertical lines of a parliamentary model. Parliamentary 
federalism is possible only where the territorial units are relatively alike in terms of 
demographic size and economic capability, as e.g. in post Second World War Germany 
whose Länder were designed by the Allied authorities (Jeffrey and Savigner 1991) in order 
to prevent  the more populous ones from  gaining control over the legislature on a 
permanent basis. 
Finally, one should note that these various cleavages have not found (nor could 
they) party-based representation, coherent with the left/right division across the EU 
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dealing with ordinary issues, but it has had a very limited political salience in the Council 
and the Commission. Moreover, when extraordinary issues such as constitutional questions 
were at stake, the left/right division did not hold even in the Parliament, where pro- and 
anti-integration positions are represented within the same political groupings, such as the 
Party of European Socialist (PES) and the European People’s Party-European Democrats 
(EPP-ED). 
In conclusion, the constitutional conflicts reflected in the French and Dutch 
referenda on the CT and in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty have produced a 
constitutional stalemate in the EU because they were not framed by a constitutional 
discourse shared by the majority of Europeans and because they were not ordered by a 
procedure (although stringent) for solving them. In fact, the unanimity procedure required 
for adopting new treaties or amending existing ones (European Union 2008: article 48) has 
precluded the formation of even a super-majority coalition supporting change. Although 
the EU is not an international organization (as it is shown by its constitutionalisation), it 
has kept an ‘amendment procedure’ which is proper of that organization. Probably, this 
unanimity procedure, which was acceptable when the Community was established in 1957 
by six nation states, is an example of institutional path-dependency. Once introduced, a 
rule (or an institution) tends to remain in place because of a political ‘increasing return’ 
(Pierson 2000), although it no longer serves the reason which brought to its original 
introduction. Moreover, the constitutional requirement of some EU member states to hold a 
popular referendum before ratifying any new treaty has introduced a further hurdle to this 
procedural context. It is not surprising that stalemate has become a regular outcome of the 
EU constitutional debate. Thus, although the EU and the US have been both characterized 
by a contested process of constitutionalisation, they have however registered different 




  24 
 Table 2 – The US and the EU: constitutional foundations 
 United  States  European  Union 
Constitutional 
basis 
constitutional text (founding 





no states’ popular referendum 
unanimity  
states’ popular referendum (some) 
Constitutional 
language 
shared, integrative, inclusive  unshared, differentiated, idiosyncratic  
Constitutional 
divisions 
sectional and political  national and political 
Constitutional 
outcomes 




Looking at the EU with the US experience in mind, one might argue that compound 
democracies consolidate themselves only when they are able to keep the disputes on the 
nature of the polity within a shared constitutional language and when they dispose of a 
procedure for solving such disputes unconstrained by the unanimity’s criteria. A common 
constitutional language and super-majoritarian amendment procedures are the necessary 
conditions for neutralizing the centrifugal impetus of the divisions between states and 
between citizens. The US experience also shows that a centripetal outcome cannot be taken 
for granted if the contenders speak a different constitutional language as happened before 
the Civil War, and if some of them do not accept some viable criteria (in that case, the 
double super majority) for solving the disputes. In light of the US experience after 1865, 
one might thus argue that the opposition to an EU constitution or constitutional treaty 
should not be in itself a cause for concern. Rather a cause for concern should be the 
difficulty of the contenders to develop a constitutional discourse inclusive of their different 
visions of the appropriate organization of the EU’s compound democracy and to rely on an 
amendment procedure which guarantees minorities without giving them an absolute veto 
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document which celebrates both the political reasons of the compound polity and the 
necessary institutional conditions for preserving it. It is not necessary to call it a 
‘constitution’ (as a similar document is not called in some democratic countries) if this 
term should provoke resistance in some member states. What matters is the recognition 
that the EU, like the US, needs both an accepted normative frame and a viable procedural 
mechanism for dealing with its internal divisions. Indeed, the EU and the US are op-ed 
polities that should be held together more by a method to handle disagreement than by a 
model for its resolution (Fabbrini 2008b).  
In conclusion, the debate that has finally begun at the European level thanks to the 
‘Laeken process’ has provided an opportunity to discuss the reasons for, and the nature of, 
integration with the only inclusive language available – constitutional language (Walker 
2007; Eriksen, Fossum and Menéndez 2004; De Witte 2002). The outcome of the debate is 
as important as the debate itself. Here, however, resides the paradox. That debate should be 
conducted with a shared constitutional language able to frame the differences among 
Europeans and should be regulated by an agreed constitutional procedure that would allow 
super-majority’ solutions of the constitutional divisions. Yet, all this appears implausible if 
Europeans can only refer to generic European constitutional traditions instead of a basic 
and common founding document. At the same time, the inevitable divisions among 
Europeans are precluding the approval of such a document. How to solve this paradox 
remains an open question. 
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